The Circassian situation was paradoxical in the sense that whereas this indigenous group for the most part intensely opposed the organization of the Winter Games in Sochi, the Games themselves denoted a rare opportunity for them to make their voices heard internationally. During the run-up to the Olympics they all of a sudden had a global audience, large segments of which were ready and prepared to listen while they communicated their claims for recognition of their cause (Hansen 2014) . This was quite simply their fifteen minutes of fame, a rare and short-lived period of celebrity and worldwide attention (Petersson and Vamling 2013) . Earlier research has indicated that marginalized and socially excluded groups as a rule do not profit from the organization of mega-events on their home ground (Minnaert 2012) . Were the Circassians then any different in this regard? In this paper we will give special attention to the extent to which Circassian activity before the Sochi Games helped Circassians in the homeland and in the diaspora to articulate their claims, and to what extent the Circassians managed to use media attention to make their causes more widely known by the international society. For the sake of clarity, it should be added that we, when using the graphic expression of fifteen minutes of fame, have in mind precisely the brief period of rather unprecedented global attention for the Circassian cause. We certainly do not suggest, however, that the Circassian issue has lost its topicality, has been removed from the international agenda, or has been successfully resolved.
Background and Setting
Historically the Circassians fiercely opposed the Russian conquest of their part of the Caucasian region for more than one hundred years and up to Russia's final victory in 1864.
Sochi was the last Circassian capital, and it has become a sacred place and a site of great symbolic value for the indigenous population and the Circassian diaspora. This is why so many Circassians were vocally critical of the idea of bringing the Olympic Games to Sochi (Bullough 2012) . Especially provocative for them was the fact that the downhill competitions of the Games were to be located in the mountains, at Krasnaya Polyana, the very site where the Russians organized their victory parade in May 21, 1864. The grounds of Krasnaya Polyana hold many Circassian remains from those battles, which gave rise to Circassian protests under the slogan: 'No Olympics on our ancestors' graves' (Persson 2013) . It added further insult to injury that the Olympic year of 2014 coincided with the 150th anniversary of the end of the Russo-Circassian war and the ensuing mass deportation of Circassians. In the last years of the war alone at least 625,000 Circassians out of a total population of 1.5 million are believed to have died (Richmond 2013, 92) . According to one estimate, as much as a stunning 90% of the Circassian population was killed during the 101 years between 1763 and 1864 in connection with the Russian campaign (Zhemukhov 2012, 505) . Richmond (2013, 91) suggests that only in 1864 was the number of Circassians that were driven to the Black Sea coast for further deportation to the Ottoman Empire between 600,000 and 750,000.
Among these the death tolls from starvation and sickness were staggering.
Substantial Circassian diasporas are today found in several countries, above all Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Israel and the US. In the homeland, situated in the Russian Federation, Circassians live in three areas of the North Caucasus: the republics of Adygeya, KarachaevoCherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. They are also found in North Ossetia and Stavropol krai and in some scattered villages on the Black Sea Coast 1 . According to the 2010 census (Vserossiiskaya perepis naseleniya 2010), the total number of Circassians (Adyghe, Cherkess Kabardians and Shapsugs) in the Russian Federation is today 719,000. The Circassian diaspora is several times bigger, but there are no reliable figures based on censuses (Besleney 2014) . Estimates of the Circassian population in Turkey, which is the main country of Circassian diaspora settlement, vary considerably; Hansen (2013) mentions a span between two and five million, whereas several other experts narrow the number down to between two and three million (Kaya 2014, 51; Papşu 2005; Besleney 2014, 31) .
After the conquest in the mid-19 th century the Russian strategy was to give the Circassians the option to resettle to Cossack-controlled areas on the plains north of the Caucasus or to emigrate. However, as Kreiten (2009, 219) notes, 'it was quite clear to Russian officials in the Caucasus that the Circassians would not leave their homeland voluntarily, but only when threatened with extermination.' Following the Russian victory, most Circassians were forced into exile to the Ottoman Empire and remaining minor groups were dislocated to other places far away from their original settlements. Measures were taken early on to prevent exiled Circassians from returning. Already in 1861 rules were set up to counter return migration to the Caucasus: 'The purpose obviously was to exclude as many return candidates as possible by introducing a whole catalogue of conditions which could not easily be met' (Kreiten 2009, 222) . The largest groups of Circassian emigrants to present-day Turkey came to live in the central and northwestern parts of the country. Thanks to their compact settlement in certain rural villages the Circassians for several generations largely managed to maintain their language and culture.
Contacts between Circassians in the homeland and in the diaspora became increasingly difficult in the early 1920s after the development of the new Soviet state and its increasing isolation, suspicion, repression and closed borders (Jaimoukha 2001, 75-76) .
During the 1930s many Circassian leaders and intellectuals in the homeland became victims of Stalin's purges. Under WWII the Circassian lands came under Nazi occupation (Jaimoukha 2001, 76-79) . The Circassians' two co-titular groups, the Balkars and Karachais, were deported to Central Asia in 1944 (but were later rehabilitated under Khrushchev in 1957).
Major political changes, basically favorable for the Circassians, took place in the region in the late 20 th and the beginning of the 21 st centuries. From having been expelled from their homeland, and thereafter regarding it as almost inaccessible, the prospect of return started to seem realistic for diaspora Circassians. Glasnost, perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 opened up the borders and allowed for reinvigorated contacts with homeland Circassians. Popular political organizations were beginning to emerge in the North Caucasus, such as the Confederation of Caucasian Peoples, to which the Circassian Musa Shanibov was elected the first president (Besleney 2014, 91-92) . Following the first international event in Ankara in 1989 to commemorate the exile, the International Circassian Association (ICA) was established in Nalchik in 1991, and became an important political actor and basis for transnational Circassian networking (Besleney 2014, 119) . At much the same time Caucasian and Circassian associations became more active in Turkey, where legislative changes were introduced in 2002 which gave organizations the right to get in touch with and join associations in foreign countries (Özgür 2011) . The Federation of Caucasian Associations (KAFFED), an umbrella organization and central actor in Circassian diaspora politics in Turkey, developed close contacts with ICA and also largely came to share its proMoscow orientation that had increased over the years (Besleney 2014, 105) . The question for the Circassian movement in general was now how to become more visible and to strive for common aims (Lagunina 2007) . In many ways it was the Sochi Olympics that provided the answer, as "it was the selection of Sochi for the Olympics that gave the activist groups the publicity boost that they needed" (Besleney 2014, 161) .
Circassian Activism: Framing and Symbolic Politics
Charles Taylor (1994) , in his treatise on the politics of recognition, famously differentiated between equality of respect and equality of dignity as the two key components of recognition.
Whereas respect denotes equal value as fellow human beings, dignity is more connected to recognition of identity claims on a collective level, of the right to belong to a distinctive and unique community. In the Circassian case, one item in particular has of late become vital for the attempts of attaining global appreciation for the dignity and indeed the identity of the Circassians, namely the striving to have the atrocities of the Russian wars against the Circassians during the mid-19 th century recognized as genocide.
As elaborated on by Zhemukhov (2012) , Circassian activists form a heterogeneous group. Starting with the most radical sentiments, the Circassian movement could according to him be visualized on a scale ranging from vocal nationalists, who would demand a state of their own for the Circassians, over sovereigntists, culturalists and centrists onto accommodationists, the latter of whom strive for reaching a common understanding with the Russian authorities. In general, the most outspoken nationalists would be found in the diaspora, whereas most accommodationists would tend to be active in the homeland in contemporary Russia, where they have to co-exist on a daily basis with the powers-that-be in an increasingly authoritarian setting.
The recognition of what Circassians claim to be the genocide committed by the Russian Empire in the mid-19th century has ever since the end of the Cold War been one of the three professed main goals of Circassian activist groups in the diaspora, alongside the right of repatriation to the homeland and the unification of Circassian territories (Zhemukhov 2012, 505-506) . Of these three, the recognition goal would seem to be the one politically most attainable in the short to medium time perspective, and it was thus to this goal that the main energy was devoted by activist groups during the years preceding the Sochi Olympics. In the words of Hansen (2014,199) , 'genocide recognition has become the new "banner" of the Circassian revival over the last couple of years'. The issue has attained symbolic value and has become a centerpiece of the identity construction of Circassian groups in the diaspora, and has come to make up the nexus of cooperation between the diaspora and the homeland (Hansen 2014) . In other words, genocide recognition has come to be almost synonymous with the struggle for recognition of the Circassian identity as an indigenous population. If widely recognized by the international community, the recognition of the genocide could potentially and in the longer run lead to the articulation of demands for e.g. certain political rights, but this has thus most often not been the immediate focus of the activities. In any case, the attention awarded to the Sochi Olympics meant that Circassians were provided with a worldwide stage on which their demands for recognition of the genocide and thus their identity, albeit for a limited while, could be vocalized with much greater resonance.
Generally speaking, politically salient diaspora activities are today, much more so than in earlier ages, undertaken in manifold ways and through a myriad of different means.
However, according to Hägel and Peretz (2005, 484) , there are still three basic forms that such activities most often take: issue-framing, agenda-setting and network-building. By framing issues at hand differently from what incumbent regimes do, activists may challenge the hegemonic status of the powers-that-be. They do so by setting agendas that differ from those advocated by the incumbents. Through both national and transnational network-building these potentially oppositional ideas proliferate and attain additional strength and support.
On the concept of framing, Entman's (2004, 5) influential definition denotes "selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution". Frames perform functions such as problem definition, identification of causes, moral judgments and the recommendation of remedies. The framings made by elites are in all societies influential for shaping popular views and ideas, but counter-framings successfully propounded from the bottom and up can be salient oppositional politics with thorough implications for the definition of the political agenda.
Committed activist groups who, in the diaspora and at home, purposefully frame events differently from what certain government structures do and strive to gain acceptance and recognition for their interpretations could with good reason be regarded as transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998) . They are well organized for political ends and equipped with elaborate ideas about what strategies to follow (cf. Auten 2006) . In the late 1990s Keck and Sikkink (1998,16-25) discerned four different tactics which advocacy networks tend to employ: information politics designed to generate credible and politically usable information; symbolic politics, i.e. the ability to evoke symbols, actions or stories that grasp the attention of far-away audiences; leverage politics which bring influence to bear on actors to change their behavior; and finally accountability politics which underscore discrepancies between stated aims and given promises, on the one hand, and actual behavior, on the other. Whereas all of these tactics seem relevant for the analysis and understanding of Circassian activism in relation to the Sochi Games, it is information politics and symbolic politics that are of special importance here.
The emergence and continuous development of information and communications technology (ICT) have served to revolutionize the contextual setting for activist groups, uniting efforts between diaspora groups and groups in the homeland, allowing for crisscrossing communication across and within different collective actors at different levels of scale. Both information and symbolic politics have become easier to effectuate, and the channels to spread the messages have proliferated. The global revolution in the modes of communication has enabled otherwise dispersed populations 'to converse, interact and even symbolize significant elements of their social and cultural lives' (Gilroy 1994, 211) .
Differently put, it has become 'much easier for diaspora groups to live on "both banks of the river" at the same time, both in diaspora and homeland' (Kaya 2004, 227) .
In connection with the Sochi Olympics Circassian activists made substantial efforts both with regard to the questions of issue-framing and, on the basis of this, agenda-setting.
The foremost examples pertain to the framing of the warfare of the Russian Empire in the mid-19 th century as genocide against the Circassians, and the placing of the recognition of this genocide on the international agenda. As we will try to show in the following, Circassian activists employed both information politics and symbolic politics to this end, the two tactics of which tend to be patently difficult and even less meaningful, to pry apart as they most often are interwoven in practice. A particular message that is regarded as objective information by one party may be seen as heavily infested with emotional symbolism, or worse, by another.
Apart from the reaching out to global audiences there is also an internal dimension to this communication process. During the run-up to the Olympics, the growing number of publications, both on-and off-line, dealing with Circassian issues offered information that had previously not been known or accessible to larger groups. The documentation of Circassian history and the publication of books and materials on the Internet became an increasingly important task for Circassian communities and organizations, both among the diaspora and in the homeland in the Russian Federation (Besleney 2010 , Hansen 2014 . This contributed to the strengthening of a common identity among Circassians at home and abroad and helped strengthen the struggle for recognition of the Circassian genocide. The appearance of interactive technology and social media contributed to the easier spread of information and transnational contacts.
It can therefore be argued that the activities before the Olympics had a generally mobilizing effect among Circassians. The remarks by a Circassian activist about his gradual understanding of his own background are indicative of the importance of such publication activities:
[…] as a child growing up in Russia, he knew very little about his ancestry. Learning Circassian history was prohibited in school, he says. "When I was a child, it was if I was a guest in my own country. But slowly, I found some information about our history, and now I understand. I am a Circassian" (Somra and Watson 2014) .
Overall, it seems that the Sochi issue brought different groups of the diaspora together and strengthened, not least through the establishment of the oppositional nosochi.com website, transnational interaction in the diaspora (Kaya 2014 , Hansen 2014 , Persson 2013 . Vocally criticizing the organization of Olympics at the site of Sochi and adamantly pleading for an international boycott of the Games (Persson 2014) , the website became a gathering point internally and was widely noticed externally. It attracted considerable international attention and became a platform for the Circassian efforts at constructing symbolic politics to promote their cause.
Symbolism and Framing
In 1992 and 1996, respectively, the parliaments of the two North Caucasian republics with the what their attitude is to both their native land and to their home country -Russia. It was obvious for me that this had no prospect (Putin, 2014) .
Not only was there in Putin's speech a discernible attempt to connect the Circassian protests with the Western encirclement that used to be part of Soviet-time rhetoric and has been brought to life in an increasingly harsh political climate of 21 st century Putinism (Petersson and Sommers 2015) . The argumentation also hints at condemning the Circassian demands as orchestrated from abroad and as the results of action by a fifth column inside the country.
More recently, the activities of the foreign Circassian diaspora have even been labelled by the presidential administration as a potential threat to Russian national security (Kornya 2015) .
This all connotes a stern warning to the Circassian opposition not to rock the boat or else face the consequences. In Putin's speech there was also a visible tendency to dismiss the Circassian complaints by claiming that moderate and mainstream elements of the Circassians do not subscribe to the anti-Olympics activism. In this respect, Putin's statement was a demonstration of the classical politics of divide and rule.
The Aftermath of the Games and the Genocide Issue
Due to the dramatic developments in Ukraine in the spring of 2014 the Circassian issue disappeared from international news rather abruptly even before the Sochi Games had formally come to an end. At this very moment international media attention changed to focus on the political movement and increasing protests on the Maidan Square in Kyiv and the subsequent development in Crimea leading up to its annexation by Russia.
Obviously, the goal of making foreign countries boycott the Games, that was advocated e.g. by the nosochi2014 website 2 , was not achieved. Moreover, as told and contrary to the expectations about some sort of official gesture during the ceremonies in Sochi, the He even used the term genocide in his address to the Armenians: April 24, 2015 is a sorrowful date linked to one of the most tragic and dramatic events in the history of humanity -the genocide of the Armenian people. One hundred years later, we bow our heads before the memory of all victims of this tragedy, which our country has always seen as its own pain and sorrow. (Putin 2015) The issue was on the agenda of the Russian parliament on April 24, 2015, whereby a resolution was passed that described the massacre of Armenians that took place in 1915 as genocide (Gosudarstvennaya Duma, 2015 In terms of the lobbying for their cause the Circassian activists groups especially in the diaspora were active both in terms of issue-framing and attempted agenda-setting. The Russian warfare in the North Caucsaus in the mid-19 th century was framed as genocide, and its recognition as genocide was put on the international agenda for discussion. It seems that the Circassians managed to carve out a niche of their own and gain international attention for it. The activities of the Circassian groups were noted by a global audience, and if Goble was right that few independent reporters on the eve of the Games could write about the Sochi Olympics without making some reference to the crimes historically committed against the indigenous population, this was certainly a great success for the lobbyists. At times the Circassians have played a game with uncertain outcomes and high stakes.
The appeals for recognition of the Circassian genocide addressed to the Georgian, Ukrainian and Estonian parliaments and governments, were symbolic in more than one respect.
Symbolic politics were certainly there as the aim was to gain recognition of the genocide, the question of which has come to be a centerpiece of the Circassians' common identity construction. In addition, however, symbolic politics were also involved in turning to what on an official rhetorical level is treated as Russia's external adversaries. This may have prompted the Russian authorities to play it tough against individual Circassians activists.
It is hard to tell what made the Circassian activists turn their appeals to the Ukrainian political leadership in the midst of the tense international situation over Ukraine and the Western criticism of Russia's obvious but non-admitted involvement in the crisis. They must have known that this move, quite in analogy to the appeal for genocide recognition to the Georgian parliament in 2010, was likely to antagonize the Putin regime. Were their actions then made because of their perception that the Circassian movement thanks to the Sochi Olympics had gained so much momentum that it could afford to advance its positions further? Or were they this time rather due to a feeling of frustration that the fifteen minutes of fame were long gone and were not likely to return?
For some while yet, the awareness of the existence of the Circassian indigenous population in North Caucasus, partly living on in the homeland under harsh conditions but above all remaining in the diaspora, will linger in the minds of the international public opinion. For how long this effect will remain no one knows, but it is safe and indeed also trite to assume that the effects of the fifteen minutes of fame will subside as time goes by.
However, through their common activities the Circassians have gained both in dignity and respect also internally. Rather than the greater but receding receptivity on the part of the elusive public opinion abroad this factor may be what ultimately helps the Circassian movement in achieving international acknowledgement of their identity claims in the future.
